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This study examines the competitiveness of four Canadian agricultural industries (eggs, 
milk, chicken and turkey) using a general equilibrium farm to retail pricing model 
developed by Wohlgenant (1989).  The model generates retail and farm pricing equations 
that are estimated using maximum likelihood developed by Johansen (1992). The results 
indicate that in all cases, long-run constant returns is rejected, indicating market power 
within the Canadian retail to farm marketing sector.  The model also finds more 
cointegrating vectors than predicted by theory, also inconsistent with competitive 
markets.  Results are based on commercial disappearance as a proxy for consumer 
demand and therefore confounding between uncompetitive markets and quality 
differences may be indicated.  Less ambiguous results would be obtained if consumer 
expenditures rather than commercial disappearance data were available.  Still, results are 
rather emphatic in rejection of competitive markets in food markets in Canada. More 
competitive markets are indicated in the United States using similar methods.  
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Background 
    
The recent rise of the Canadian dollar to parity with its US counterpart has 
focused attention on the lack of purchasing power parity between the two countries.  The 
reluctance of Canadian retailers to lower prices to Canadian consumers has once again 
given rise to questions concerning the competitiveness of the Canadian retailing system. 
Within agriculture, there has been a long history of complaints that the farm to 
retail sector does not operate in an efficient and competitive manner.  This is often 
discussed within the context of the transmission of price information from consumers to 
producers.  One function of an efficiently functioning agricultural industry is how fast 
and how effectively changes in consumer demand and trends in consumer demand are 
transmitted through the marketing chain.  How well this is accomplished depends on the 
costs of operating the marketing chain and the market power that exists within the 
marketing chain. 
This study will determine the overall competitiveness of the food price 
transmitting system in Canada.  The study will use a model developed by Wohlgenant 
(1989) for the food industry in the US.  Advantages of using this setup include that no a 
priori restrictions of fixed proportions or product homogeneity are used in the 
development of the market clearing relationships under the assumption of perfect 
competition. A test of market power in this framework is shown by Reed and Clark 
(2000) to be a test for cointegration assuming that variables used in the analysis are 
characterized by unit root non-stationarity.  The lack of a cointegrating relationship 
among the variables would suggest the existence of market power.  Too many 
cointegrating relationships implies further refinement of theory is needed, perhaps related 
to the variables included within the analysis or the need for additional model 
development.  
Further tests of market power not related to cointegration are parametric tests of 
long run constant returns to scale, symmetry and tests of oligopsony market power.  The 
rest of this study will describe the model and present some results for four Canadian food 
industries: eggs, chicken, milk and turkey.   
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A Long-run Model of Retail and Farm Prices  
This section describes a model of competitive long run equilibrium developed by 
Wohlgenant (1989) and Wohlgenant and Haidacher (1989).  From the standpoint of 
integrated non-stationary time series theory, this model is an attractive one because, at 
least at the present time, the economic theory only describes long-run relationships. From 
an economic policy standpoint, the model is also important because it describes long-run 
relationships among food and farm prices.  Therefore, estimates derived from this model 
can be used to gain insights into such issues as to how farm gate prices change given 
changes in retail prices.     
One measure of the effectiveness of an agricultural policy is the impact such a 
policy will eventually have on consumer-level food and farm-level prices. For example, 
questions of market power by an industrialized food sector have direct implications for 
policy. Presumably, economic policies will influence food and farm prices differently in 
competitive markets than in imperfectly competitive markets. Even in competitive 
markets, however, the transmission of exogenous shifts to consumer and farm level prices 
differ across industries, and estimates of this transmission may reveal why different 
industries might respond differently to policy changes. Furthermore, estimating food and 
farm price relationships within the rigor of a well-posed economic model provides 
analysts with the opportunity to uncover key structural parameters from time series data.  
The economic model used to demonstrate our selected techniques was developed 
by Wohlgenant (1989), and Wohlgenant and Haidacher (1989). The model is a flexible 
representation of a competitive food market in which retail and farm prices are 
determined by the interaction of supply and demand in all input and output markets. 
While consistent with economic theory, the price relationships of the model are not 
constrained by the highly restrictive fixed-proportions production assumption, or by the 
restriction that an industry consists of identical (and marginal) firms. In particular, even if 
firms within the same industry produce output in different fixed proportions, the model 
describes an aggregate industry that varies input proportions as relative input prices 
change. In competitive market equilibrium, the industry would satisfy consumer 
preferences for a variety of individual food items.  
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While the long-run competitive model allows for the entry and exit of firms, it 
differs from the more restrictive textbook case of identical firms by accounting for long-
run rents earned by fixed assets of some firms within an industry.    Such assets include 
locational advantage or entrepreneurial capacity (Panzar and Willig, 1970). The long-run 
static nature of the model makes it an attractive one to use to illustrate our chosen set of 
cointegration techniques.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to derive the model’s quasi-reduced 
form equations, the derivation is straightforward, and the restrictions implied by theory 
are easy to impose. The retail and farm price equations are based on profit maximization 
of food marketing firms (i.e., retail, wholesale, and manufacturing firms) in a competitive 
market, market-clearing in the farm and retail markets, perfectly elastic non-farm input 
supply, and an unspecified farm supply function. Furthermore, the quasi-reduced-form 
equations account for shifts in consumer demand with a single variable constructed from 
a complete system of consumer demand equations.  
If Pr represents the retail price, Pf  represents the farm price, F represents the farm 
supply, W represents a vector of non-farm input prices, and Z represents a single demand 
shifter (i.e., a linear combination of demand shifters in a consumer demand system), an 
industry’s quasi-reduced form equations are  
Z A   +   W A   +   F A   =   P
 
Z A + W A + F A = P
fz fw ff f
rz rw rf r
       ( 1 )    
All variables in equation (1) are expressed in logarithms, so the Aij coefficients of the 
model are  price flexibility coefficients.  
The first equation of (1) relates the retail price (Pr) of an industry to the 
appropriate farm supply (F) of the industry, a vector of non-farm input prices (W), and a 
single shift in consumer demand (Z).  The second equation relates the same set of 
variables to the industry’s farm price (Pf). It has been shown elsewhere (Wohlgenant and 
Haidacher, 1989) that the coefficients of (1), combined with an estimated consumer 
demand system, exactly identify the structural parameters underlying the supply and 
demand functions for retail output and farm inputs.  Furthermore, the pair of equations 
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given by (1) can be used to test three important restrictions.  Tests of the first two 
restrictions amount to tests of market power, while a test of the third restriction amounts 
to a test of the transmission of farm price changes to consumers.  The remaining portion 
of this section outlines the hypotheses to be tested.  
Test of Oligopsony Power 
The specification of (1) is based on the notion that the food industry is perfectly 
competitive in acquiring farm commodities in national markets.  Rejecting an alternative 
model that accounts for oligopsony power would support (1), and imply that decisions by 
a few individual food manufacturing firms influence farm prices.  Rejecting this 
alternative would support the view that  ‘captive’ supplies are a competitive market’s 
response to changing market conditions.  
If an industry is competitive in acquiring farm commodities, the marginal value 
product of the farm commodity equals the farm price.   The test for oligopsony is based 
on the notion that if some food manufacturing firms influence farm prices by restricting 
purchases of farm inputs, a ‘gap’ between the market-determined farm price and the 
marginal value product for the farm commodity emerges at the market level.  Theory 
indicates this gap consists of functions of variables that shift the farm supply schedule, 
such as stock variables and prices of inputs used in farm production.  A test for the 
existence of oligopsony power amounts to determining whether such variables add 
explanatory power to the competitive model described by (1).  
The null hypothesis of the oligopsony test is that the industry is competitive in 
acquiring farm commodities, and the equations of (1) apply.  To capture the notion that 
the marginal value product of the farm commodity equals the farm price in competitive 
markets, it is necessary to combine the equations of (1).  Using the two equations to 
eliminate F, the model reduces to  
         (2)  Z B   +   W B   +   P B   =   P z w f f r
where the Bk coefficients are functions of the Aij coefficients of (1).  Implicit in (2) is the 
notion that the marginal value product of the farm commodity equals the farm price.  
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From a competitive industry’s viewpoint, shifts in the farm supply are completely 
captured by the farm price.  
Under the alternative hypothesis of oligopsony power, variables that shift farm 
supply enter equation (2).  Consider a vector C that contains stocks of farm commodities 
and prices of inputs used in farm production.  If the food industry exerts oligopsony 
power, the alternative model is    
C B   +   Z B   +   W B   +   P B   =   P c z w f f r        (3) 
Implicit in (3) is the notion that the marginal revenue product equals the farm 
price.  If the industry exerts oligopsony power, shifts in the farm supply schedule are 
important because they partially define an industry’s marginal revenue product.  
The procedure used to test for oligopsony power requires specifying (3) and 
testing whether Bc = 0. If the variables of (3) are stationary, a test of  Bc = 0 can be 
performed using a standard F test.  However, if the variables of (3) are integrated, the 
usual F test will not be reliable, and the test for the presence of oligopsony power can be 
reduced to testing whether equations (2) or (3) are cointegrated relationships. 
From the point of view of the cointegration methods presented below, finding a 
(single) cointegrating relationship within the estimation of the Johansen (1992) maximum 
likelihood procedure without including the vector of C stocks would amount to a test of 
oligopsony power.  The reason is that, if the variables Pr , Pf , W and Z combine to create 
a cointegrating relationship, the addition of the other variables in the C vector are not 
important in defining the cointegrating vector in the long run.  Hence Bc = 0 in equation 
(3).    
Test of Symmetry 
Prices determined in perfectly competitive input and output markets equate 
industry supply and demand of inputs and output.  Faced with market-clearing prices, 
price-taking firms in perfectly competitive markets maximize profits.  Since the equations 
in (1) are derived by equating supply and demand in input and output markets, a test of 
perfect competition in the model reduces to a test of whether firms maximize profits.  The 
symmetry test is a test of profit maximization.  
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The test derives from the inherent symmetry of an industry’s profit function.   The 
condition of interest here is that the response of food supply to a change in the farm price 
equals (the negative of) the response of an industry’s demand for the farm product to a 
change in the retail price of food (e.g., Silberberg, Chapter 6).  If Sf denotes the cost 
share of the farm ingredient used in food production, Wohlgenant and Haidacher (1989, 
p. 17-19) show that if the elasticity form of this condition holds, the restriction 
A S - = A fz f rf               (4) 
on (1) also holds.  It is important to note that the market power restriction may fail to 
hold if the industry exerts either oligopsony or oligopoly power, or if a profit function 
cannot adequately represent an industry of nonidentical firms.  This implies that failure to 
reject market power restrictions cannot be interpreted as solely due to market power, but 
could also be due to other confounding factors such as functional form bias.  Therefore, 
failure to reject these restrictions is a necessary, but not sufficient, reason to conclude 
market power exists in the industry.   
Symmetry requires testing cross equation restrictions.  Only single equation 
restrictions can be tested using the statistical package (STATA) used to estimate the 
cointegrating relationships.  Hence it is not presented below. 
Test of Constant Returns of the Farm Input 
In a traditional analysis of farm and retail food prices, food is assumed to be 
produced in fixed- factor proportions.  Fixing factor proportions imposes many 
restrictions on a competitive economic model, but among the most noted is the restriction 
that each percentage increase in farm price translates into a percentage increase in 
consumer prices equal to the cost share of the farm input.  It turns out, however, that this 
same relationship holds under variable factor proportions if markets are competitive, and 
if the farm input provides constant returns in food production.  
Wohlgenant and Haidacher (1989) show that if constant returns with respect to 
the farm input holds, the restrictions  
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A -   =   A
 
A - = A
ff fz
rf rz
      ( 5 )  
on (1) also hold.  The restricted quasi-reduced form under constant returns is therefore   
Z A   +   W A   +   F A -   =   P
 
Z A - W A + F A = P
fz fw fz f
rf rw rf r
 
Now suppose farm supply expands exogenously.  The above restricted model 
implies, that for each percentage increase in farm supply, retail food prices fall by Arf 
(<0) and farm prices fall by Afz.  Hence, when farm supply changes exogenously 
(reducing farm prices exogenously), consumer food prices change by the ratio of -
Arz/Afz .  But by symmetry (equation (4)), this ratio is Sf, or the cost share of the farm 
input.  Failure to reject the constant-returns restrictions provides a more general 
explanation of a relationship implied directly by fixed proportions models in perfectly 
competitive markets.  
Data  
Data were collected for four supply managed industries: eggs, milk, chicken and 
turkey. Monthly data on retail and farm prices were collected from regular CANSIM data 
sources.  All data run from January, 1997 through February 2005 for 98 observations.  
Other variables included in the analysis include interest rates as a proxy for the cost of 
capital and exchange rates as a proxy for the export sector.  A farm wage rate was 
included as a proxy for farm labour costs.  Data were converted to per capita data using 
aggregate Canadian population data.    
Quantity variables were commercial disappearance data and prices unit values.  
Therefore, quantity variables used to estimate the model did not include quality 
differences and these quality differences could have been transferred to prices (e.g. Reed, 
Levedahl and Clark (2003) and Nelson (1991)).  Furthermore, since the measure of 
commercial disappearance is not unique, them neither is the measure of demand or unit 
values.  Therefore, results are not invariant to the choice of quantity in the estimation.  In 
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this sense, conclusions drawn from these data may confound important quality 
differences resulting from competitive markets with those of imperfect markets.  Hence 
important quality differences may not be adequately represented within the analysis and 
are a weakness of this model.  
A much better proxy for consumer demand is derived from consumer expenditure 
data (e.g. Reed, Levedahl, and Clark (2003)).  However, lack of adequate time series 
availability in Canada precludes the use of such data.     
Results and Discussion 
Development of the Z variables included within the analysis requires the 
estimation of a demand system.  The demand system was estimated but the results are not 
presented, and available upon request.  
All variables are first tested for unit root non-stationarity and none of these 
variables rejected a single unit root. These results are also not presented, and available 
upon request.        
Since unit root non-stationarity cannot be rejected, we proceed to estimating the 
testing for cointegrating vectors and testing for constant returns to scale.  We do this 
using Johansen’s (1992) maximum likelihood method.  The results are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Results of estimating the farm and retail price equations 
 
Industry             number of cointegrating relationships        Constant returns to scale 
 
Eggs:    Retail  Price    1      reject 
           Farm Price      1          reject 
Chicken:  Retail  Price    2      reject 
               Farm Price      2          reject 
Milk:    Retail  Price    2      reject 
           Farm Price      3          reject 
Turkey:        Retail  Price    3      reject 
                Farm Price      3          reject 
Source: From estimates of retail and farm price equations  
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The test of long run constant returns is rejected in all cases, indicating market 
power.  In all cases, there is evidence of at least one cointegrating vector, consistent with 
no market power.  However, in only one industry (eggs) is a single cointegrating vector 
indicated (as required by theory).  In all others, more than one cointegrating vector is 
evident and this result is not consistent with the competitive theory that establishes 
precisely one cointegrating vector. 
An adequate explanation for additional cointegrating vectors is required.  One 
explanation for an additional cointegrating vector is Canadian monetary policy, that 
establishes a relationship between exchange rates and interest rates (two variables used in 
this study).  However, assuming this explanation is justified, this could explain the 
existence of two cointegrating vectors (in chicken and milk retail prices) but not the 
existence of three in milk farm price and turkey (or for that matter the lone cointegrating 
vector in eggs retail and farm price equations).   Another explanation of too many 
cointegrating vectors is the existence of market power since all deviations from the 
competitive norm are given this interpretation in this study.  This explanation is also 
consistent with rejection of long run constant returns to scale in all cases. 
Conclusion 
The results indicate that the competitive model developed by Wohlgenant finds 
very little support in Canadian agriculture. Only in one of the four industries studied 
(Chicken) was the number of cointegrating vectors predicted by theory found.  In all 
cases, long run constant returns was also rejected, also indicating market power. Our 
results indicate that the model is rejected because too many rather than too few 
cointegrating vectors were found.  One explanation of this result could be a high degree 
of market power in Canadian agriculture. Given this explanation, we find a high degree 
of market power at the retail level of the market, implying that the countervail of supply 
management may be needed for Canadian food producers.  These results are in contrast 
to Reed and Cark (2000) for the US, where more evidence in favour of competitive 
markets is found. 
  
  9 
The strong rejection of the competitive model ought to be tempered by two 
problems with this study.  The first is that data used to test the model were commercial 
disappearance data.  Commercial disappearance data may lead to confounding of 
differences in quality for evidence of market power.  Data that does not have these 
drawbacks includes food expenditure data, but these data are not available for sufficiently 
long time series to be including within this study. 
 The second is that algorithms of sufficient generality to test all the empirical 
implications of the competitive model were also unavailable.  Namely, tests of symmetry 
required cross equation restrictions that could not be tested using the available software.  
Furthermore, since the algorithm could only test restrictions a single equation, each 
equation was estimated separately from the others.  The theory indicates that the 
equations were generated from a general equilibrium framework. A better approach 
would be to estimate all the variables simultaneously and test cross equation restrictions 
within a multivariate framework.  This approach awaits the development of more 
powerful estimation algorithms for cointegrating vectors.      
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